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DETECTING LIES USING DEMEANOR, BIAS, AND
CONTEXT
Max Minzner*

INTRODUCTION

A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that the jury is
the lie detector.
-United States v. Scheffer l
The Supreme Court's statement in Scheffer reflects the
conventional wisdom of the American legal system-courts assume that
jurors, by closely observing demeanor, can accurately determine
whether a witness is lying. 2 The consensus in the legal and social
science literature is almost the opposite. "It is considered axiomatic...
that individuals are at best inaccurate at deception detection." 3 Among
legal academics, demeanor is seen as essentially useless in detecting
deception, and decisions about lie detection are right no more than half
4
the time.
The negative legal academic perspective is based largely on two
law review articles, both written well over a decade ago. 5 While these
articles accurately summarized the literature on deception detection at
the time, more recent research provides reason to believe that the
Even though demeanor is often
academic view is incomplete.
unhelpful, in certain situations jurors and law enforcement officers can
distinguish true and false stories with substantial accuracy using other
methods. More importantly, we can identify situations in which they

* Assistant Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; E-mail:
minzner@yu.edu. I am grateful to Monica Hakimi, Margaret Lemos, Alexander Reinert, and
Stewart Sterk for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.
1 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1997) (internal quotations omitted).
2 NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 487 (2d Cir. 1952) ("Demeanor evidence may
sometimes mislead, but our courts regard it nevertheless as an excellent cue to the trustworthiness
of testimony.").
3 A.P. Hubbell, et al., The Relative Effects of Timing of Suspicion and Outcome Involvement
on Biased Message Processing,68 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 115, 115 (2001).
4 See infra Part I.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 24-39.
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are likely to make the right decision about whether a witness is lying
and, in turn, those situations in which their judgment is likely to be no
better (and perhaps substantially worse) than a coin flip.
Part I provides a brief discussion of the divide between judges and
academics in their opinion of the accuracy of legal credibility decisions
and the role of demeanor evidence in making those determinations.
Judges have generally assumed juries make accurate credibility
decisions and believe demeanor is the mechanism for deciding whether
a witness is telling the truth. Starting in the early 1990s, though, legal
academics broke from this consensus view based on a series of social
science studies demonstrating that test subjects in laboratory
experiments correctly determined when a person was lying only slightly
more than half the time.
Part II reviews more recent social science findings that
demonstrate that the general consensus among legal academics is at
least incomplete.
Current studies show that the reality is more
complicated than the legal literature reflects. In certain conditions,
juries and law enforcement can differentiate between truth and lies.
First, biases about witness credibility play a large role in determining
whether deception will be caught. If a jury expects to hear the truth
from a particular witness and that witness generally tells the truth, the
jury will usually get the decision right. If, in turn, a witness who is
expected to lie generally tells the truth, decisions about deception will
usually be wrong. Second, context can dramatically improve lie
detection accuracy. If the jury possesses information about the events
that remains undisclosed to the witness, the witness is likely to be
accurately classified as a liar or a truth teller. However, if private
information is unavailable, observers are unlikely to make the right
decision.
Part III applies these results in the criminal context. In particular, I
examine decisions about deception by juries and by law enforcement
regarding two types of speakers. First, I consider the attempt to classify
correctly statements by cooperating witnesses testifying for the
government or being interviewed as part of the cooperation process.
Second, I look at situations where the defendant or a suspect is the
witness, either when testifying at trial or during police interrogation.
Part IV concludes by placing these results in the context of the use
of social science by legal academia. While the initial reviews of the
value of demeanor evidence reflected a nuanced view of the social
science literature, at least in the demeanor context, legal academics have
tended to rely on the sound bite version of social science studies and
failed to return to the original sources. To the extent that academics
hope to persuade courts of the value of social science, more nuance is
better.
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LIE DETECTION THROUGH DEMEANOR

Courts often claim that demeanor is the way to distinguish the truth
from lies. Several areas of law rest on a strong belief in the connection

between demeanor and credibility. First and foremost, the Supreme
Court has relied on the jury's ability to judge credibility from demeanor
as a core policy foundation underlying the Confrontation Clause
requirement of live witness testimony. Since Mattox v. United States,
the Court has seen the benefit of the Clause as giving the accused "an
opportunity ... of compelling [the witness] to stand face to face with

the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether
he is worthy of belief."'6 The Court has continued to rely on the value of
demeanor in setting the scope of the Confrontation Clause's
Along with the oath and cross-examination, the
requirements. 7

requirement that the jury be in a position to observe witness demeanor
in order to judge credibility is the means of ensuring "that evidence
admitted against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous
adversarial testing that is the norm of Anglo-American criminal

proceedings."' 8 Indeed, demeanor alone can decide a criminal case.
Juries may reject a defendant's testimony solely based on demeanor.
Once the jury concludes a defendant has committed perjury, they are
entitled to take that as affirmative evidence of guilt. 9

Second, the role of demeanor in assessing witness credibility
provides one of the standard (and oldest) justifications for appellate
deference to lower court fact finding.10 Whether a question is an issue

of law or an issue of fact often turns on whether a credibility
determination needs to be made based on demeanor.1 1 The Court has
identified the connection between demeanor and credibility as a source

6 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); Donelly v. California, 228 U.S. 243
(1913).
7 Confrontation "permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the
demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility."
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
8 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990).
9 Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992).
10 See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 342-44 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (pointing out the
role of demeanor in credibility determination as justification for appellate deference); Lilly v.
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (2001) (describing demeanor as a "factor uniquely suited to the
province of trial courts"). The Supreme Court relied on the role of demeanor in making
credibility decisions as a reason for deference to lower courts in admiralty cases almost as far
back as the Civil War. See The Quickstep, 76 U.S. 665, 669 (1869).
11 Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111, 114 (1995); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 11314(1985).
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of appellate deference to trial court decisions to disqualify jurors, 12 to
state court decisions in the habeas context, 13 to district court evaluations
of the credibility of the reasons proffered by the government during
Batson challenges, 1 4 and for the very existence of the clearly erroneous
standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).15
Law enforcement training manuals have generally taken the same
view-accurate lie detection depends on demeanor evidence. Police
officers often must evaluate whether witnesses and suspects are telling
the truth during interviews. The most influential current training
method for law enforcement is the Reid technique, outlined in Reid and
Inbau's book Criminal Interrogation and Confessions.16 The authors
claim to have trained over 150,000 law enforcement officers in the past
35 years. Inbau and Reid explicitly encourage law enforcement officers
to evaluate demeanor. For example, they assert that "a suspect who
does not make direct eye contact is probably withholding

information."' 17 Similar texts express comparable views.' 8 While these
texts are based on the experience of law enforcement officers working
in the field, they do not rely on any formal empirical findings for their
belief in the value of demeanor.
Legal commentators traditionally adopted the same approach to
demeanor as courts and law enforcement, concluding that the demeanor
of a witness was "the solution of the always difficult problem of

determining the truthfulness of his testimony."' 19 Beginning in the
12 Judges must "reach conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own
evaluations of demeanor evidence and of responses to questions." Rosales Lopez v. United
States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981); see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984).
13 Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983). Demeanor is also one of the reasons
why evidentiary hearings are required in some habeas cases. "Where an unresolved factual
dispute exists, demeanor evidence is a significant factor in adjudging credibility." Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 322 (1963).
14 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991). In the multistage Batson process for
objecting to the government's use of race in the striking of jurors, a defendant must first make a
preemptory showing that the government is engaging in race-based strikes. Next, the prosecutor
must provide a race-neutral justification for striking the juror. Finally, the court must evaluate the
justifications and determine whether the government engaged in purposeful discrimination. At
the second stage, the district court must evaluate the credibility of the prosecution's claimed race
neutral justification. The Supreme Court requires substantial appellate deference for that
credibility determination because of the importance of demeanor in that decision. See, e.g.,
Miller-el v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328, 339-41 (2003).
15 See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).
16 FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (Jones and Bartlett
2004) (1962).
17 Id. at 151.
18 DAVID E. ZULAWSKI & DOUGLAS E. WICKLANDER, D.E., PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF
INTERVIEW AND INTERROGATION (CRC Press 1993) (1992).
19 Henry S. Sahm, Demeanor Evidence. Elusive and Imponderables, 47 A.B.A. J. 580, 580
(1961). "[D]emeanor evidence 'may satisfy the tribunal, not only that the witness' testimony is
not true, but that the truth is the opposite of his story."' Fleming James, Jr., Sufficiency of the
Evidence and Jury-ControlDevices Available Before Verdict, 47 VA. L. REV. 218, 223-24 (1961)
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1960s, though, social scientists started laboratory experiments on the
value of demeanor evidence. 20 These studies found that while the
subjects had strong beliefs about cues of deception, these beliefs bore
little relationship to reality. 21 For instance, while subjects believed that
witnesses who were lying tended to have shifty eyes, witnesses who
were lying did not avert their gaze more frequently than witnesses
telling the truth. More importantly, when presented with an equal
number of true and false statements, lie detection accuracy hovered
around the level of chance. Evaluations of deception detection were
accurate between 45% and 60% of the time. 22 Studies of law
enforcement officers show similar results. While some studies show
that law enforcement officers outperform civilians, the results are mixed
23
at best.
These social science results did not immediately penetrate the legal
literature. 24 In the early 1990s, though, law review authors began to
present arguments doubting the value of demeanor in making credibility
determinations. 25
In particular, Olin Wellborn 26 and Jeremy
(quoting Dyer v. McDougall, 201 F.2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952)). Demeanor was viewed not just
as a mechanism to determine whether a witness was truthful, but also whether he has the capacity
to observe what he claimed to have seen. "When an eyewitness testifies at trial, the defendant's
most valuable weapon is the opportunity to probe the witness' subjective abilities so that the jury
may consider his responses and demeanor in assessing the credibility of his testimony." James
W. Jennings, Preserving the Right to Confrontation-A New Approach to Hearsay Evidence in
Criminal Trials, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 751 (1965).
20 While serious research did not begin until the 1960s, the first studies occurred in the 1920s
and found that jurors hearing live testimony performed worse on deception judgments than those
who reviewed transcripts. See William M. Marston, Studies in Testimony, J. AM. INST. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 5, 22 (1924).
21 For summaries of these results, see Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie
Detection, and the Jury, 33 CoNN. L. REV. 1, 7-14 (2000) and Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of
The Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness
Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1190-94 (1993).
22 See Miron Zuckerman et al., Verbal and Nonverbal Communication of Deception, 14
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 26 (1981).
23 See Samantha Mann et al., Detecting True Lies: Police Officers' Ability to Detect Suspects'
Lies, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 137, 137 (2004); Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, "He's
Guilty! ": InvestigatorBias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469,
470 (2002).
24 As late as 1985, articles were emphasizing the importance of demeanor evidence in
determining witness credibility. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Demeanor Impeachment Law and
Tactics, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 183, 186 (1985).
25 James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903, 906 (2000). Some law
professors had previously noted the weak empirical foundations for the strong judicial statements
about demeanor, but none had much impact. See Edward H. Cooper, Directionsfor Directed
Verdict: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REV. 903, 934 (1970) ("[C]ompared to
persons making judgments based on recordings or transcripts of the same testimony, persons
making judgments on the basis of observation of the 'witnesses' form significantly less accurate
judgments."); Charles T. McCormick, Deception-Tests and the Law of Evidence, 6 TENN. L. REV.
108, 127 & n.50 (1928) (noting that jurors relying on demeanor were only correct in their
determinations 48% of the time). This later article is the earliest statement in the law review
literature of which I am aware disputing conventional beliefs about demeanor.
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Blumenthal 27 prepared detailed surveys of the then-current
psychological literature on deception detection. Wellborn's 1991 article
was the first to introduce psychological studies of deception detection to
a legal audience in a systematic way.
Relying on studies from the 1960s through the early 1980s,
Professor Wellborn pointed out that test subjects were less accurate in
detecting deception when they observed the speaker on videotape rather
28
than when they reviewed transcripts or listened to an audio recording.
In addition, experimental subjects did not make significantly better
deception judgments when observing cues from the speakers' face or
body. Wellborn recognized the potentially significant differences
between laboratory experiments and the courtroom environment,
particularly the presence of context, cross-examination, deliberation,
and preparation, but he dismissed these as mechanisms that might
improve decisions about deception and argued that they are in fact
likely to reduce the validity of deception determinations. 29 Wellborn
concluded that "the experimental evidence indicates that ordinary
observers do not benefit from the opportunity to observe nonverbal
behavior in judging whether someone is lying" and cited the nowconventional wisdom that "most people cannot do much better than
chance in discerning lies in laboratory conditions. '30 Even more
troubling, mock jurors believe that they are far better lie detectors than
3
they actually are. 1
Blumenthal concurs in Wellborn's analysis.
Blumenthal
emphasized that the public held strong views about nonverbal behavior
that indicated deception.32 However, the cues "popularly believed to
manifest deception are qualitatively and quantitatively different from
those which are actually observed during deception. ' 33
People
generally believed that a reduction in smiling, an increase in furtive
glances, fidgeting, and gaze avoidance indicated that the witness was
lying. In fact, none of these beliefs had support in the social science
literature. 34 Blumenthal concluded that "it is unforgivable that the legal
system deliberately ignores demonstrated, relevant findings about
demeanor evidence and willfully adheres to an ineffectual traditional
35
approach.
26 Olin Guy Wellborn 11, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1075 (1991).
27 Blumenthal, supra note 21.
28 Wellborn, supra note 26, at 1086-87.
29 Id.at 1079.
30 Id at 1088.
31 See George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 707 (1997);
Wellborn, supra note 26, at 1088.
32 See Blumenthal, supra note 21, at 1194.
33 Id.
34 Id.at 1194.
35 Id.at 1204.
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Neither article gained traction among courts or legislatures. Only
three decisions have cited either Blumenthal or Wellborn for the
proposition that demeanor evidence is overrated; all three do so merely
in passing. 36 The Federal Rules have preserved the traditional view on
demeanor. Rule 43 continues to require that testimony be taken live in
open court. In limiting the use of video testimony, the advisory
committee notes stress that "[t]he importance of presenting live
testimony in court cannot be forgotten.... The opportunity to judge the
demeanor of a witness face to face is accorded great value in our
tradition. '37 Of course, the importance of demeanor remains a
justification for excluding hearsay evidence under the Rules of
Evidence, 38 and the use of demeanor evidence remains a standard part
39
of jury instructions.
In contrast to the reaction among courts, both the Blumenthal and
Wellborn articles have been widely adopted in the law review literature.
Legal commentators have generally accepted the view that
"psychological studies strongly indicate that observers do no better than
pure chance in evaluating live witnesses. ' 40 Indeed, Blumenthal and
36 Edmunds v. Deppisch, 313 F.3d 997, 1000 (7th Cir. 2002); Morales v. Artuz, 281 F.3d 55,
61 (2d Cir. 2001); Koskela v. Willamette Indus, 978 P.2d 1018, 1028 & n.14 (Or. Ct. App. 1999),
rev'don other grounds, 15 P.3d 548 (Or. 2001). 1 am not aware of any court citing to any of the
original social science literature on demeanor discussed in this Article or in the Blumenthal and
Wellborn pieces.
37 FED. R. Civ. P. 43 advisory commitee notes, 1996 Amendment.
38 FED. R. EVID. advisory commitee notes, Intro. to Art. VIII; Williamson v. United States,
512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994).
39 See, e.g., JUDICIAL COMM. ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT,
MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE EIGHTH
CIRCUIT § 3.04(2007); PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTINOS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF
THE FIRST CIRCUIT 3.06 (2007); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL

CASES) 2.2 (2003).
40 David Crump, The Case for Selective Abolition of the Rules of Evidence, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 585, 610 (2006) (citing Blumenthal and Wellborn). Recent articles taking the view that
demeanor is generally unhelpful include Leo Kittay, Note, Admissibility ofFMRI Lie Detection,
72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351, 1388 (2007) ("[S]tudies have shown that people are not good at
determining anothers' truthfulness."); John Leubsdorf, Presuppositions of Evidence Law, 91
IOWA L. REV. 1209. 1252 (2006) ("Empirical research shows that jurors are not able to tell by
observing witnesses which of them is telling the truth."); Deana Kim EI-Mallawany, Comment,
Johnson v. California and the Initial Assessment of Batson Claims, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3333,
3354 (2006) ("Studies have shown, however, that judging credibility based on demeanor is
susceptible to great inaccuracy." (citing Wellborn)); Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the
Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on
Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. REV. 945, 948 n. 12 (2004) ("[U]ntrained individuals cannot
do much better than chance in discerning lies under experimental conditions."); Chad M.
Oldfather, Appellate Courts Historical Facts, and the Civil Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 437, 458 (2004) ("The experimental evidence strongly suggests that the ability to observe
demeanor is of no value in assessing witness credibility."); Charles H. Koch, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 139, 156 & n.64 (2004) ("That the one who hears the witness is best able to
evaluate the testimony is a fundamental assumption of the common law. However, this
assumption may not be supportable in fact."); John G. Douglass, Virtual Cross Examination: The
Art ofImpeaching Hearsay, 34 J. MAR. L. & COM. 149, (2003) ("In fact, there is no empirical
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Wellborn have largely displaced the original social science research
among legal commentators. Aldert Vrij and Bella DePaulo, two of the
most prolific deception detection researchers, have fewer citations
combined than either Blumenthal or Wellborn has individually. 4 1
We now are in a situation where there are two competing
consensus views about demeanor and credibility. Legal critics deride
demeanor evidence and conclude that lie detection is essentially
impossible; courts depend on it. As the next section shows, neither
view is right. Wellborn and Blumenthal's studies were accurate and
thoughtful summaries of the psychological literature regarding
demeanor evidence at the time they were written. Today's findings,
though, are far more complex than the then-current research and give us
a much greater ability to identify those situations in which we need to
worry about mistaken judgments about credibility and those in which
we do not.

II.

DECEPTION DETECTION RESEARCH: DEMEANOR, BIAS AND CONTEXT

Research on deception detection has generally presented only
limited variations on a theme. These studies usually involve displaying
either live or video testimony to college students and asking them
whether the witness was lying. Part II.A describes the current state of
the research on deception detection and demeanor. In general, the
research supports the conclusion that demeanor plays little role in
improving accuracy. Part II.B, though, demonstrates that this result
does not support the further conclusion that deception detection
accuracy is no better than flipping a coin. Indeed, results suggest that in
evidence that jurors' assessments of credibility based on witness demeanor are likely to be any
more reliable than random guesses."); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges-Gatekeepers or
Usurpers, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 32 (2000) ("However, the most recent psychological research
indicates that a witness's demeanor on the stand can be so idiosyncratic that it is often an
unreliable indicator of the witness's truthfulness."); Robert J. Condlin, What's Really Going On?
A Study of Lawyer and Scientist Inter-DisciplinaryDiscourse, 25 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 181, 249-50 (1999) ("[T]here are no reliable standards for deciding when an eyewitness is
telling the truth."); Donald Dripps, Miscarriagesof Justice and The Constitution,2 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REv. 635, 670-71 (1999) ("Empirical evidence overwhelming indicates that ordinary people
cannot detect deception by observing demeanor."); Chris W. Sanchirico, CharacterEvidence and
the Object of Trial, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1227, 1245 (2001) ("The experimental evidence on lay
assessment of demeanor casts serious doubt on the ability to human subjects to assess witness
credibility"); and James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law Judge,
54 ADMIN. L. REv. 1355, 1397 & n.179 (2002) ("In general, most people have difficulty
detecting lies. Thus, relying on non-verbal behavior produces results roughly equivalent to
chance.").
41 A Westlaw search of the JLR database performed July 12, 2007 for "demeanor /50 (vrij
depaulo)" produced 14 hits, while similar searches for "demeanor /50 wellborn" and "demeanor
/50 blumenthal" produced 89 hits and 36 hits, respectively.
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certain circumstances, we should expect accuracy to be substantially
higher or lower than the 50% mark. First, when the evaluators of
deception are biased in the correct way, accuracy is significantly
improved. Second, when evaluators have secret information about the

events described, accuracy is also much higher.
A.

Demeanorand Deception Detection

The traditional approach to demeanor in the legal system depends
on two assumptions: first, that liars and truth-tellers reliably exhibit
different cues; and second, that observers can detect these cues. Two
recent meta-analyses 42 have summarized the current findings relating to
the existence of deception cues. First, a 2003 study by Bella DePaulo
and co-authors reviewed 116 studies examining deception detection.4 3
They found that, in general, few reliable cues to deception exist and in
particular, the cues widely believed by the public to signify deception
generally do not.
As mentioned above, gaze aversion, speech
disturbances (use of "ah" and "um"), longer and more pauses, eye
blinking, and fidgeting are all usually considered signs of deception. In
fact, liars do not avert their gaze any more frequently than honest
witnesses, 44 and the same is true for these other behaviors widely
associated with deception; DePaulo finds that all of these effect sizes
are "small. 4 5 Sporer's 2007 study of a more limited set of cues came to
similar conclusions. Looking at 12 standard behaviors identified with
deception, including, among others, gaze aversion, smiling, and
fidgeting, the Sporer study found little evidence that these nonverbal
46
cues bore any relationship to deceit.
42 Siegfried L. Sporer et al., Moderators of Nonverbal Indicators of Deception: A Metaanalytic Synthesis, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1 (2007); Bella M. DePaulo et al., Cues to
Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74 (2003). A meta-analysis is a statistical technique that takes
other social science studies as the observational units and tries to measure an effect size across all
of the studies. DePaulo et al. use Cohen's d to measure effect size while Sporer et al. use the
functionally equivalent Pearson's correlation measure r. Id. at 89; Sporer, supra, at 2 & n.2;
JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 20-24 (1988).
This choice of measures of effect size, as well as the general theory underlying meta-analyses, is
subject to quite reasonable criticism. See Chris W. Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the
Upside of Cognitive Error, 57 STAN. L. REV. 291, 311 & n. 93 (2004); RICHARD BERK,
REGRESSION ANALYSIS: A CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE, 196-200 (2004). Despite these critiques,
meta-analysis and the use of d or r remain relatively standard among applied social scientists.
43 DePaulo et al., supra note 42.
44 Id. at 93 (noting that the effect size of the estimates of gaze aversion and eye contact were
not significantly different than zero).
45 Id. at 95. DePaulo, consistent with Cohen, selects a threshold of -.02<d<0.2 as defining a
"small" effect size. One of the traditional indicators of deception, a rise in vocal pitch, exceeded
this threshold in the DePaulo study. Id.
46 Sporer did find that liars decreased their hand and finger movements and that this effect
size was greater than "small." Sporer et al., supra note 42, at 17. Note that this result was not
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Even if cues to deception exist, the relevant question for the legal
system is whether observers can detect these cues. Extensive studies

have considered the ability to distinguish between true and false
statements in the experimental context. An early review of pre-1980

studies showed an average accuracy rate of 57%.47 A similar 2000
review of studies from the previous twenty years found a similar result
-an accuracy rate of 56.6%.48 These results are the basis of the
conclusion generally cited in the legal literature that lay observers are

only slightly better than chance at detecting deception.
Most

recently,

Charles

Bond and Bella

DePaulo recently

summarized the studies of deception detection in a large-scale metaanalysis. 49
They found a comparable summary statistic-study
participants correctly classified truths and lies with a mean accuracy rate
of only 53.46%.50 This summary statistic, though, conceals some
variation. Deception detection improves moderately when the receiver
has access to a more varied medium-observers who see but do not

hear the sender are less accurate than those who hear but do not see and
both are less capable than observers who can both see and hear the
sender. 5'
Prepared lies are somewhat harder to detect than
unprepared. 52 Overall, though, Bond and DePaulo conclude that "rates
of lie detection vary within a narrow range ....within a few points of
50%."53 In summary, these results are generally consistent with the
dismal view among legal academics. Demeanor cues do not lead to
accurate lie detection.

found in the DePaulo study-its results did not find a significant relationship between deception
and hand movements. DePaulo et al., supra note 42, at 92.
47 R. E. Kraut, Humans as Lie Detectors. Some Second Thoughts, 30 J. COMM. 209 (1980).
48 ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT 75 (2000).
49 Charles F. Bond Jr. & Bella M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 PERS. &
SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 214 (2006).
50 Id. at 222. This figure is the weighted mean; the unweighted mean was comparable at
53.98%. Id. at 219. While this effect appears small, it is strongly statistically significant. Id at
222 (concluding that the weighted mean is significantly different from the null hypothesis that the
mean is 50% at a level ofp < 0.0001). Furthermore, it compares favorably to other effect sizes in
social psychology. For instance, this is approximately the same effect size observed in support of
the conclusion that men are, on average, more aggressive than women. Bond and DePaulo
measure the effect size here using the same method as the DePaulo 2003 study mentioned above
and is subject to the same criticism. See DePaulo et al., supra note 42. Bond and DePaulo find a
d of 0.39, which is the equivalent of an r of0.21. F.D. Richard and co-authors surveyed a number
of meta-analytic studies in 2003 and provided r figures for comparison. See F.D. Richard et al.,
One Hundred Years of Social Psychology Quantitatively Described,7 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 331
(2003). In that survey, they found that the average r for the conclusion that men were more
aggressive than women was also 0.21.
51 Bond & DePaulo, supra note 49, at 226.
52 Id. at 227.
53 Id.at 231.
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New Results on DeceptionDetection

While the social science results discussed in Section ILA support
the view that examining demeanor alone does not lead to accurate
credibility determinations, they do not demonstrate that real world
credibility decisions are accurate only 50% of the time. More recent
studies suggest that in certain situations, lie detection accuracy is likely
to be substantially better than that figure suggests, while in others, it is
likely to be substantially worse. First, the inaccuracy of demeanor cues
only matters if jurors and police officers actually rely on them. While
people purport to believe that demeanor cues indicate whether speakers
are lying, recent work suggests that people do not actually use these
cues to make decisions.54 By contrast, while demeanor does not play a
significant role in real-world deception detection, the context
surrounding the speaker's statement does appear to matter. When
observers have background information about the witness's statement,
they use it and lie detection accuracy improves considerably. Finally, if
context is unavailable, recent results suggest that bias plays an
important role.5 5 The observer's initial likelihood of believing the
witness largely determines the ultimate conclusion about truthfulness.
Skeptics of legal lie detection assume that individuals rely heavily
on demeanor cues. This assumption initially appears well-founded. In
experimental studies, people claim to be able to identify demeanor cues
56
to deception and express confidence in their ability to evaluate them.
However, this result is likely an artifact of the experimental designexperimenters may be effectively forcing people to rely on demeanor.
In 2002, researchers surveyed almost 200 undergraduates about
situations in which they had detected someone lying in their life and
asked how the lie was uncovered. 57 The survey strongly indicates that
demeanor plays a limited role in real-world lie detection. Respondents
identified verbal and non-verbal behavior as a deception detection
mechanism in only 11.4% of the reported lies and even then, the
mechanism was generally used in combination with some other
technique. Demeanor standing alone was only used to detect deception
58
in 2.1% of the lies.
If people do not rely on demeanor to detect deception, what does
drive the decision to classify a witness as truthful? Study subjects
reported relying heavily on context. They detected lies using
54 See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
55 See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
56 See Bella DePaulo et al., The Accuracy-Confidence Correlation in the Detection of
Deception, 1 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 346, 346 (1997).
57 Hee Sun Park et al., How People Really Detect Lies, 69 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 144 (2002).
58 Id. at 150-51.
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information received from third parties, physical evidence, and solicited
confessions. 59 The timing of lie detection also supports the relative
unimportance of demeanor. Demeanor cues should lead to immediate
lie detection, but subjects reported detecting lies long after they took
place. Over 80% of the lies were discovered more than an hour after
60
they were told and over 60% were uncovered over a day later.
A recent study of juror questioning further suggests that observers
rely heavily on context when making credibility decisions. When
context is not available to jurors, they seek it out. Shari Seidman
Diamond and her co-authors recently examined the questions that jurors
posed to witnesses in 50 Arizona civil trials, where court rules provide
for juror questioning. 6 1 A plurality of the questions asked (42%) fell
into the category they label "cross-checking," questions asked to
generate evidence from disinterested witnesses to compare to the
testimony of witnesses whose credibility is more dubious. 62 Jurors not
only sought out this information, they were displeased when they could
not get it. The study had access to videotapes of jury deliberations and
when reviewing the video, they found that "jurors often bemoan the
absence of a witness to the events who is not associated with one of the
parties, and would thus presumably offer a more trustworthy, or at least
independent account of the events that transpired. '63
Observers not only use context, they also use it effectively. Recent
studies show that detailed questioning by an interrogator with an
informational advantage substantially increases lie detection accuracy.
In two studies, Maria Hartwig and collaborators tested the effect of
questioning when the questioner knows information that the subject
does not know and discloses it during the interview. 64 In both studies,
the experimenter had the subject engage in a mock crime and provided
the interrogator evidence about the crime that was unknown to the
subject. In the first study, the experimenters videotaped interrogations
where the questioner engaged in either early or late disclosure of the
information. Either the witness learned the secret information at the

59 Considering those lies that were detected by a single method, the respective figures for
third party information, physical evidence, and solicited confessions were used in 32%, 18%, and
3.6% of the cases. For lies detected by a combination of methods, the respective figures are
52.1%, 30.9%, and 18.6% of cases. Id.
60 Id. at 152. As Park et al. note, these results are likely biased in favor of shorter response
times because respondents were directed to think of a recent lie. Id.
61 See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Questions During Trial: A Window Into Juror
Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1927 (2006).
62 Id.at 1956-57.
63 Id. at 1960.
64 Maria Hartwig et al., Strategic Use of Evidence During Police Interviews: When Training
to Detect Deception Works, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603 (2006) [hereinafter Hartwig I]; Maria
Hartwig et al., Detecting Deception via Strategic Disclosure of Evidence, 29 LAW & HUM.

BEHAV. 469 (2005) [hereinafter Hartwig II].
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start of the interview before questioning began or alternatively, the
interviewer waited to disclose the information until after the subject had
already told a story. When the information was disclosed late in the
interview, accuracy decisions increased substantially. Judges who
observed late disclosure of evidence were correct in 61.7% of cases
compared to merely 42.8% of cases in which the judges observed early
disclosure of the evidence. 65 Not surprisingly, when presented evidence
in advance, liars incorporated it into the lies they told, making deception
detection more difficult.
Hartwig's more recent study produced even stronger effects. In the
second study, Hartwig trained police investigators to disclose evidence
late and ask questions relating to the concealed evidence without
revealing it. Experimenters then compared the deception detection
ability of trained questioners to an untrained control group.
Interrogators trained to disclose evidence late correctly classified 85%
of true statements and 85.7% of false statements, compared to untrained
interrogators, who classified correctly only 57.1% of true statements
and 55% of false statements. 66 The study not only observed large
effects, but also identified a mechanism.
Trained questioners
successfully induced inconsistencies in false stories. 67 The DePaulo
meta-analysis results support the findings of both of these studies.
While liars do not give off demeanor cues, they do tell stories that are
less logical, less consistent, and contain fewer details than those of
truth-tellers. 68 These traits should be far more apparent if the questioner
has an informational advantage and can use it to craft good questions.
When context is unavailable, what determines accuracy rates?
Researchers have consistently seen a veracity effect in deception
studies-people classify truthful messages more accurately than false
ones. The DePaulo study found that people correctly classify 61.34% of
truthful messages as truthful but only 47.55% of false messages as
false. 69 These results are robust and have been demonstrated widely

65 Hartwig I, supra note 64, at 477. Notably, this study shows a reversal of the truth biaslate disclosure of evidence led to accurate judgments in 67.6% of false statements but merely
53.8% of true statements. Id.
66 Hartwig 1I, supra note 64, at 613.
67 Id. at 617.

68 In addition to physical demeanor cues, DePaulo and colleagues expanded their study to
include cues relating to the external verifiability of stories told. These experimenters found that
liars provide fewer details than truth tellers, are less likely to embed their stories in context, and
are more likely to tell implausible stories, stories that are illogical, and stories with internal
discrepancies. DePaulo et al., supra note 42, at 92, 94-97. These findings support the Hartwig
results.
69 Id. at 223. These figures reflect the unweighted means. They are comparable to earlier
results recognizing the differential evaluations of true and false statements. See VRIJ, supra note
48, at 69 (finding that observers detect true statements at a 67% accuracy rate but false statements
only 44% of the time).

2570

CARDOZO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 29:6

across the literature. 70 The source of the veracity effect is a "truth bias."

Experimental subjects are substantially more likely to decide a
statement is truthful than deceitful. 71 As a result, they are far more
accurate at identifying truths than lies. 72 The source of the truth bias is
unclear, although one commonly proposed explanation is that the bias

results from a version of the availability heuristic.

Because most

statements encountered in ordinary life are true, people tend to assume
73
that statements are more likely than not to be accurate.
Regardless of the source of the truth bias, it has important
implications for deception detection. Levine and his co-authors have

recently demonstrated that whether true statements are believed and

false statements disbelieved is largely a function of two factors: the
74
strength of the truth bias and the base rate of message truthfulness.
When receivers are more likely to evaluate messages as true than false,

these receivers will generally classify messages
messages are truthful but will usually be wrong
are false. A symmetric result holds for a lie bias.
come as a surprise-people who tend to believe

correctly when most
when most messages
This result should not
most statements will

usually be accurate if most messages are truthful.

This tendency

suggests that the common finding that deception detection accuracy
rates hover around 50% is an artifact of the research design, holding

only if half of the messages are true and half are false.
These results do not mean that, absent context, people are better at

judging deception than random chance would predict.

Indeed, it

70 See Samantha Mann et al., Detecting True Lies: Police Officers 'Ability to Detect Suspects'
Lies, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 137, 137 (2004) ("[Jludges are more likely to consider that
messages are truthful than deceptive and, as a result, truthful messages are identified with
relatively high accuracy (67%) and deceptive messages with relatively low accuracy (44%).").
71 For instance, the DePaulo study found that 55.23% of statements are coded as true even
though the standard practice in deception detection experiments is to include an equal mix of true
and false statements. This figure also reflects the weighted mean. Again, the unweighted mean
was comparable at 56.86%. Id. at 223. See generally Kevin John Heller, The Cognitive
Psychology of CircumstantialEvidence, 105 MICH. L. REv. 241, 286 (2006).
72 Levine et al. demonstrate this result in a very straightforward manner. They show highly
positive correlations (ranging from 0.5 to 0.66) between truth bias and truth accuracy and highly
negative correlations between truth bias and lie accuracy (ranging from -.075 and -0.82). By
contrast, there is limited correlation between truth and lie accuracy. Timothy Levine et al.,
Accuracy in Detecting Truths and Lies: Documenting the "Veracity Effect," 66 COMM.
MONOGRAPHS 125, 141 (1999).
73 VRIJ, supra note 48, at 69; Maureen O'Sullivan et al., The Effect of Comparison on
Detecting Deceit, 12 J. NONVERBAL BEHAV. 203, 205 (1988). Vrij suggests that general rules of
social politeness or stereotypes about deceptive behavior might also cause a truth bias. VRIJ,
supra, at 69.
74 See Timothy Levine et al., Deception Detection Accuracy is a PredictableLinear Function
of Message Veracity Base Rate: A Formal Test of Park and Levine's Probability Model, 73
COMM. MONOGRAPHS 243 (2006); Hee Sun Park & Timothy Levine, A Probability Model of
Accuracy in Deception Detection Experiments, 68 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 201 (2001); Levine,
supra note 72. The description in the text elides some of the complexities of the analysis which
are outlined further in the Appendix.
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supports exactly that conclusion. If the truth bias and the base rate
determine accuracy rates, we can still think of the classification of
statements as true or false as the outcome of a coin flip, but not a fair
coin flip. Instead, at least in the experimental context, the coin is
weighted to come up true more than 50% of the time. 75 As the next
section shows, different observers have different biases that may lead to
more (or less accurate) classification of liars and truth-tellers. Jurors
and law enforcement may have coins that are biased in different
directions.

III.

BIAS, CONTEXT, COOPERATORS AND DEFENDANTS

What do these results about demeanor, bias, and context indicate
about lie detection in the legal system? The results about context are
relatively straightforward. When a legal decision-maker possesses
private information and uses it to probe the witness's story, lie detection
accuracy will improve. As a result, we should expect inaccurate lie
detection in single-witness cases, where all of the evidence about the
event comes from one source. By contrast, we can be more optimistic
when more information is available. If the police and juries have
multiple independent sources of information about an event, they are far
more likely to accurately decide which witnesses to believe. The results
with respect to bias are more complicated. Rather than examining
generic lie detection ability, we need to investigate whether the bias fits
well with the base rate. Do jurors and law enforcement tend to be truthbiased when witnesses are likely to be truthful, and, alternatively, do
they tend to be lie-biased in situations where witnesses are likely to be
lying? Note that, from a legal standpoint, we are not primarily
interested in whether particular decision makers are truth-biased or liebiased in the abstract. Instead, we are concerned with the fit between
bias and reality.
Do the legal structures cause juries and law
enforcement to be skeptical of the lying witnesses and credulous of the
truthful witnesses? If so, we should be optimistic about lie detection
decisions. In turn, if there is a lack of fit, i.e., jurors and police officers
are lie-biased toward generally truthful witnesses and vice versa, we
should be very pessimistic-under those circumstances, lie detection
decisions are apt to be right far less than half the time.
In general, then, lie detection accuracy should be heterogeneouslie detection decisions should be generally correct when they are made
75 See Levine et al., supra note 74, at 256. Levine, et al. effectively model deception
accuracy rates knowing simply the truth bias and the base rate, suggesting that we can view each
truth/lie evaluation as simply a single draw from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter 0 where
0 represents the truth bias.
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by individuals with substantially more information than the witness and
when their predispositions about whether the witness will be truthful or
deceitful match reality. However, when the witness is aware of what
the receiver knows about the incident, or when the receiver's bias does
not match the base rate, lie detection accuracy is likely to fall well
below the 50% mark. In this Part, I discuss the implications of these
results in two important criminal law contexts: statements by
cooperating witnesses and by defendants.
A.

DetectingLies by CooperatingWitnesses

Cooperating witnesses have become an essential feature of the
federal criminal system. If the government believes that a defendant is
providing truthful information and believes that the defendant may be of
assistance in future cases, the government will offer the defendant the
opportunity to plead guilty to some or all of the crimes he committed
pursuant to a written cooperation agreement. At the time of the
cooperator's sentencing, the government submits a letter to the court
pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the sentencing guidelines, 76 outlining the
cooperator's substantial assistance provided to the government,
including information on whether the cooperator participated in
undercover investigations, testified at trial, or aided in other ways.
Detecting cooperator lies begins with the government.
Cooperators in the federal system engage in extensive proffer sessions
with the government prior to being signed up to cooperation
agreements. A primary, if not the sole, decision to be made in the
proffer session is whether the potential cooperator is telling the truth.
This environment is one where the value of context should lead us to
expect relatively good detection accuracy, particularly in cases where
the government already knows a great deal about the information
Indeed, federal prosecutors express
provided by the cooperator.
substantial confidence in the cooperation process. 77 That confidence is
likely justified when the cooperator does not learn what information the
government already knows. However, lie detection probably varies
considerably from case to case. Ellen Yaroshefsky's 1999 survey of
former Southern District of New York Assistant United States
Attorneys asked about the information provided to cooperators, and at
least three of the AUSAs surveyed indicated that prosecutors at least
occasionally provided information to cooperators either intentionally or
76 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1 .1 (2007).
77 See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth
Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 917, 932 (1999) (finding that three-quarters of
prosecutors surveyed believe that the government obtain truthful information from cooperators).
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accidentally. 78
Yaroshefsky's study also provides information about bias,
specifically the type of deception that law enforcement is trying to
detect. By and large, prosecutors believe that cooperators frequently
minimize their own criminal conduct 79 but rarely falsely implicate
others. 80 The government expects cooperators to tell stories that both
reduce their role in the offense from participant to witness and that
subtract from the number of criminal transactions involved. If the
government's presumption is correct, lie detection is likely to be very
accurate in proffer sessions. On the other hand, if cooperators often
falsely implicate defendants, lie detection is likely to fail. We do not
know enough about base rates in this context to draw strong conclusions
about whether this bias is correct or incorrect.
Once the government has decided that a cooperator is truthful, the
burden of lie detection shifts to the jury. Jurors have strong, wellrecognized biases about witness testimony, 8' but we do not know their
biases about cooperator testimony. In the federal system, cooperation
agreements require cooperating witnesses to either tell the truth at trial
or lose the benefits of the cooperation. Prosecutors are generally
confident that the truth-telling provisions work, while commentators are
often skeptical about the effectiveness of these incentives. 82 However,
83
we have little actual data about the rates at which cooperators lie.
78 Id. at 960. With respect to paid confidential informants, DOJ Guidelines strongly
encourage not disclosing information to them. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES REGARDING THE USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS (Oct.
2003) (redacted version), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/dojguidelines.pdf.
No comparable guidelines exist with respect to cooperating witnesses, but my experience as an
AUSA in the Eastern District of New York reflected similar training. AUSAs were strongly
discouraged from disclosing information learned from other sources to cooperating witnesses.
79 Yaroshefsky, supra note 77, at 957 & n.189.
80 Id. at 933.
81 One very commonly cited result is that jurors vastly overestimate the value of eyewitness
evidence. For instance, one study found that mock jurors predict an accuracy rate of about 7 1%
for eyewitness testimony, when the actual accuracy rate was only 13%. See Steven Penrod, &
Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 817, 819
(1995); cf Gary L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness
Identification, J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440, 447 (1979) (jurors believe 4 out of 5 mistaken
identifications). For a general summary of cognitive psychology results with respect to direct
evidence, see Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Circumstantial Evidence, 105
MICH. L. REV. 241, 247-53 (2006). However, these results generally focus on the question of
evaluating honest but inaccurate testimony rather than dishonest testimony.
82 Compare Yaroshefsky, supra note 77, at 932 (finding that three-quarters of prosecutors
surveyed believe that the government obtain truthful information from cooperators) with George
C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1,
51 (2000) (expressing skepticism about the value of the truth-telling provisions in cooperation
agreements).
83 What we do know is that false cooperator testimony is involved in a large number of
convictions later identified as wrongful. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United
States 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 543-44 (2005).
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Given that we lack the base rate of cooperator honesty in the abstract,
we should have significant concerns about whether jurors are biased in
the correct direction. One can easily imagine that jurors might exhibit a
lie bias and strongly discount cooperator testimony despite the truthtelling provisions. If cooperators are generally truthful, this lie bias
would lead to highly inaccurate truthfulness evaluations.
The
alternative situation is equally possible; jurors may tend to believe
cooperators even though they usually lie. The core point is that accurate
deception detection is only likely to occur when base rates align with
biases, i.e. when juror expectations about truth-telling match reality.
We do not know much about either base rates or biases for cooperator
testimony, but we have no reason to think that juror biases regarding
cooperators' credibility match the reality of this credibility with any
frequency.
There is also little reason to believe that context improves jury lie
detection with respect to cooperator testimony. Jurors are unlikely to
have concealed, private information about the stories that cooperators
tell. Jurors receive the vast majority of their information about the case
from the government. Cooperating witnesses only take the stand when
the government (1) already believes the story that the cooperator is
telling and (2) expects that story to be consistent with the other evidence
in the case. Jurors, then, will only know private information that is
potentially inconsistent with the cooperator testimony when that
evidence is in the hands of the defendant. Defense investigation, of
course, is widely recognized as limited compared to that of the
84
government.
These conclusions do not suggest that cooperators frequently lie.
As discussed above, the government preparation of cooperators is often
designed to avoid exactly that outcome, and we have reason to think
that it works. However, these conclusions suggest that jurors do not
bring much additional lie detection ability to the table. The deception
detection skills that jurors have do not apply when cooperators testify.
B.

DetectingLies by the Defendant

We have reason to be somewhat more optimistic about jurors'
ability to classify accurately the truthfulness of defendant testimony,
although the results are still mixed. Jurors are far more likely to see the
84 See Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
CriminalAdjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1585, 1602-03 (2005); Michael McConville & Chester
L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
581, 762 (1986-87) (reporting study results that defense counsel only interviewed witnesses and
visited crimes scenes in only 4% of nonhomicide cases).
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defendant cross-examined by a questioner with private information
since the government will often know information about the events of
the crime that has not been disclosed to the defendant. 85 The value of
context also suggests that we should be more confident that the jury will
correctly classify the testimony of defendants in cases that are
investigated more deeply. If the government has put more time and

effort into investigating the crime, more private information will be
available to the government and the jury at the time of trial.

For

instance, in reactive cases, 86 in which a crime occurs and the
government investigates it after the fact, the government's information
about the case is necessarily limited in scope. In proactive cases, in
which the crime and investigation occur contemporaneously, the
government possesses a wide range of available evidence-gathering
tools, from wiretaps to more mundane physical surveillance. In these
proactive cases, the private information known to the government will

be much more extensive, and the jury's deception detection will be
substantially improved. 87 We should expect that jurors should be more
likely in these cases to classify correctly truthful defendants as honest
and lying defendants as dishonest.
While the context analysis gives some reason for optimism, the
bias question leads us in the other direction. We have limited data
about whether real jurors have a truth bias or a lie bias for defendants. 88
Even studies analyzing the different but related question of the effect of

defendant testimony on conviction rates have found effects that are
unclear. 89 We also know little about base rates in this context. We do
not know whether testifying defendants are generally truthful. Again,
we have little reason for optimism that base rates match biases. There is
85 This is one of the classic justifications for the more limited nature of discovery in criminal
cases than in civil cases. See H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent?
Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1089, 1090-91 (1991); William J. Brennan, Jr., The CriminalProsecution. Sporting Event
or Questfor Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 289.
86 See Kevin Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 709, 718
(2006) (distinguishing between proactive and reactive cases); Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies, and
Videotape: The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious Groups, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1201, 127172 (2004) (same).
87 Some of this evidence will be disclosed to the defendant in discovery. For instance, a
defendant will receive any wiretap recording including his statement. See FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(a)(l)(B) (requiring disclosure of defendants' recorded statements). Physical surveillance,
recordings not involving the defendant, and a myriad of other types of evidence need not be
disclosed in advance.
88 1 am only aware of one study even remotely on point involving real jurors. See Mitchell J.
Frank & Dawn Broschard, The Silent CriminalDefendant and the Presumption of Innocence: In
the Hands of Real Jurors, Is Either of Them Safe?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 237, 268 (2006)
(finding that 59.5% of jurors disagreed with the statement "I found the defendant credible").
89 "Three studies have examined defendant testimony at trials and the results are
inconclusive." See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical
Research, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 680 (2000).
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not much reason to expect jurors' preconceived notions about the
likelihood of the defendant testifying truthfully to actually match
reality.
By contrast, we know substantially more about the attempts of law
enforcement to detect lies told by defendants. While law enforcement
officials are not consistently better in deception detection than lay
jurors, they are consistently different. In particular, studies show a
weaker veracity effect for law enforcement. Training in detecting
deception and law enforcement experience generally reduces truth
bias. 90 Some studies show that certain law enforcement officials have a
substantial lie bias. 9' Lie bias is likely to be substantially stronger in the
real world as a result of the specifics of law enforcement training. The
92
primary law enforcement training methodology, the Reid Technique,
instructs officers to decide whether an encounter is treated as an
interrogation or an interview. While "interviews" are non-accusatory
and designed for information gathering, "interrogations" are overtly
accusatory and "should be conducted only when the investigator is
reasonably certain of the suspect's guilt. '93 This division between
interrogation and interview should construct a strong lie bias in the
former context but truth bias in the later context. 94 The quality of
deception detection is then going to be heavily dependent on the base
rate. If the initial decision to treat the encounter as an interview or
interrogation is good, individuals who are likely to lie are going to be
expected to lie and accuracy will be high. On the other hand, if the
initial decision is poor, the base rate and bias will be mismatched and
decisions about truthfulness will frequently err. This result also
suggests that lie detection ability is going to be heterogeneous across
law enforcement. Officers who make good initial decisions to sort
witnesses into the interview and interrogation categories will make good
lie-detection decisions, while those whose initial decisions are poor will
succeed in lie detection at much lower rates.
In law enforcement interrogations, context would initially seem to

90 See Timothy Levine et al., Testing the Effects ofNonverbal Behavior Trainingon Accuracy
in Deception Detection with the Inclusion of a Bogus Training Control Group, 69 W.J. COMM.
203, 213-15 (2005) (effect of training on truth bias); Meissner & Kassin, supra note 23, at 478
(police investigators substantially more likely to identify statements as deceitful than students).
91 See Mark G. Frank & Thomas Hugh Feeley, To Catch a Liar: Challengesfor Research in
Lie Detection Training,31 J. APPLIED COMM. RES. 58, 65 (2003).
92 The Reid technique is named after John Reid, one of the authors of Criminal Interrogation
and Confessions, the standard law enforcement interrogation training manual. See INBAU, supra
note 16. Reid claims to have trained over 500,000 law enforcement officials in interrogation
techniques since the early 1970s. See John E. Reid & Assoc., Inc., Interviewing & Interrogating,
http://www.reid.com/trainingjprograms/interview-overview.html (lasted visited Feb. 18, 2007).
93 See INBAU, supra note 16, at 7-8.
94 More accurately, it should construct a lie bias for exculpatory statements and a truth bias
for inculpatory statements in the interrogation context.
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allow good lie detection. Law enforcement officials will often have the
capacity to generate a great deal of private information and not disclose
it to the defendant. Law enforcement training on this point suggests
some internalization of these norms. Inbau and Reid encourage a strong
mastery of underlying facts. 95 The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, the
leading law enforcement periodical, 96 frequently publishes articles on
interrogations that strongly encourage extensive preparation prior to an
However, the advice to law enforcement on
interrogation. 97
concealment of evidence is less heartening. While Reid and Inbau
caution against "revealing fo the suspect at the outset of the
interrogation all the specific evidence that implicates him," 98 other
sources take a different view, including some which encourage
disclosing evidence to suspects in order to evoke a confession.9 9
In practice, though, there is further reason for pessimism about the
First, we lack
accuracy of lie detection during interrogation.
information about the reality of law enforcement training. The work
that has been done on this subject suggests that law enforcement
officers receive limited training on deception detection. 100 Second,
studies on the practices of law enforcement interrogation show that
evidence is frequently disclosed to defendants. Richard Leo's seminal
1996 study of real-world interrogations found that in 85% of
interrogations, officers began by confronting the suspect with at least
some of the evidence against him. 10 1 Officers who surrender their
informational advantage are likely to impair their accuracy
95 Id. at 12.
96 The LEB is published by Law Enforcement Communication Unit of the FBI Academy and
according to its website, is "the most widely read law enforcement publication in the world...
with an estimated readership of 200,000" readers in the law enforcement community. See The
Unit,
Communication
Law
Enforcement
Academy:
FBI
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/td/academy/lecu/lecu.htm (last visited July 2, 2007).
97 See, e.g., Andre B. Simons & Brian Parsi Boetig, The Structured Investigative Interview,
FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., June 2007, at 9, 10; Randy Bowling & Dave Resch, Child
PornographyCases, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Mar. 2005, at 1, 2; Scott O'Neal, Interviewing
Self-confident Con Artists, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Mar. 2002, at 16, 19.
98 INBAU, supra note 16, at 235.
99 Compare Bowling & Resch, supra note 97, at 6 (suggesting that officers "show case facts
and refer to real or implied evidence to convince the suspect of the futility of denial"); David
Vessel, Conducting Successful Interrogations,FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Oct. 1998, at 1, 4
(encouraging confronting subjects "with the facts and issues surrounding the incidents") with
Michael R. Napier & Susan H. Adams, Criminal Confessions: Overcoming the Challenges, FBI
L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Nov. 2002, at 9, 12 (instructing interrogators on how to ask questions
without disclosing information).
100 A recent survey of Texas law enforcement found that on average, officers participated in
one lecture course on interviewing and in most cases, the training only involved interrogations of
suspects rather than interviews of witnesses or victims. See Lori H. Colwell et al., The Training
of Law Enforcement Officers in Deception Detection- A Survey of Current Practices and
Suggestionsfor Improving Accuracy, 9 POLICE Q. 275, 282 (2006).
101 See Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266,
277 (1996).
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substantially.

CONCLUSION

There remains a great deal that we do not know about lie detection
that should matter to the legal system, but we know more than the legal
literature usually reflects. While the newest results on lie detection
support the now-traditional view in legal academia that demeanor is not
a valuable tool in making credibility decisions, they undermine the
further conclusion that accurately detecting lies is impossible and, as a
result, we should view credibility decisions by juries as no better than a
coin flip. When bias and context are incorporated, we should expect
that deception detection accuracy is highly heterogeneous and varies
substantially based on the situation. We just do not yet know enough
about bias, base rates, and the value of context to say whether the social
science evidence supports the currently skeptical view on legal lie
detection.
We also do not know whether some common policy
recommendations survive this new evidence.
For instance,
commentators have criticized the fact that jurors are instructed to rely
on demeanor. While there is reason to be concerned about these
instructions, there is significant evidence that jurors are not heavily
swayed by jury instructions. Studies of jurors show relatively limited
comprehension and retention of jury instructions. 10 2 Similarly, we
know little about the relative accuracy of judges and juries. For
instance, we do not know whether the group structure of a jury makes
them better lie detectors than judges. Studies are mixed on whether
groups are more successful at detecting lies than individuals. 103 We also
do not know whether the fear of reversal creates incentives for judges to
102 See Shari Seidman Diamond & Mary R. Rose, Real Juries, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
255, 272 (2005); Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors' Understandingof the Law in Real Cases, 16
LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 539, 550 (1992). This is a nice example of a situation in which a cognitive
error may help the legal system avoid a problem that it would otherwise face. See Chris William
Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error,57 STAN. L. REV. 291, 364
(2004).
103 Two studies have analyzed the relative abilities of individuals and groups in deception
detection with slightly different results. Compare Mark Frank et al., Individualand Small Group
Accuracy in Judging Truthful and Deception Communication, 13 GROUP DECISION &
NEGOTIATION 45 (2004) (finding that groups and individuals judged truthful statements correctly
at similar rates but that groups were more accurate in judging false statements), with E. Park et
al., Group and Individual Accuracy in Deception Detection, 19 COMM. RES. REP. 99 (2002)
(finding no difference between group and individual accuracy for either true or false statements).
These mixed results are comparable to the findings in the broader literature on the role cognitive
bias in the group versus individual contexts. See N. Kerr et al., 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687, 713
(1996) (concluding that there is no simple empirical answer to whether groups or individuals are
likely to make biased judgments).
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make better decisions than juries who are likely immune to this concern.
We do not know what effect motivation has on accuracy. 10 4 As a result,
we do not know whether this evidence supports or undermines the
notion of appellate deference. Perhaps the best lesson to be drawn from
these new results is the value of caution in the face of new social
scientific evidence. Wellborn's article has been correctly praised for its
sensitivity in the use of empirical evidence, 105 while more recent
discussions have drawn stronger conclusions on weaker evidence. In
this context, our bias should be toward caution.

104 DePaulo's meta-analysis reviewed a number of studies that provided incentives to lie
successfully and found increases in some of the traditional deception cues. While unmotivated
liars do not differ significantly in their eye contact, motivated senders in fact do avert their gaze
when lying more frequently than they do when telling the truth. Furthermore, motivated liars
appeared tenser and more likely to increase their vocal pitch. DePaulo concludes that "for studies
in which there was no special incentive for succeeding, cues to deception were generally weak.
Overall, the size of the effects increased somewhat when some incentive was provided." DePaulo
et al., supra note 42, at 97. This effect was increased when the cues related to transgressions by
the liar or involved subjects that related to the speaker's self-identity. Id. at 104.
105 Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87
VA. L. REV. 1491, 1539-41 (2001).
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APPENDIX ON LEVINE/PARK RESULTS

This appendix provides a formal statement of the claims outlined
supra in the text accompanying note 74. Below I present a modified
version of the Levine/Park results in support of the conclusions claimed
10 6
in the main text.
Adopting their notation, define P(H) as the probability that a
message is judged as honest, P(-H) = 1- P(H) as the probability a
message is judged as a lie, P(T) as the probability that a message is
true (called the "truth base rate"), and P(-T) = I- P(T) as the
probability a message is false. Further let P(H IT) and similar
constructions have their standard meaning as conditional probabilities.
Subjects are defined as exhibiting a veracity effect if they more
accurately classify true statements than false ones, represented formally
as P(H IT) > P(-H I-T).
Levine/Park suggest that truth accuracy, lie accuracy, and total
accuracy can be modeled using a simple Bayesian construction. That is,
truth accuracy is the probability that a message is both true and judged
as honest.
P(T)P(H I T) = P(TfH) = P(T I H)P(H)
Similarly, lie accuracy is the probability that the message is false and is
judged as dishonest.
P(-T)P(-H I -T) = P(-TlH) = P(-T I -H)P(-H)
Levine/Park demonstrate that accuracy rates can be modeled as a simple
linear function of the truth base rate, with slope P(H I T) - P(-H I -T)
and intercept P(-H I -T).
P(HflT) + P(-H l- T) = P(H I T)P(T) + P(-H I -T)P(-T) =
P(- I -T) + (P( IT)- P(-H I -T))P(T) (Equation 1).
Figure One reproduces a modified version of Figure 1 from Park/Levine
2004 showing the data in support of their result.

106 See Levine et al., supra note 74, at 243; Park & Levine, supra note 74, at 201; Levine et
al., supra note 72, at 125.
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1

Truth Base Rate

The main text makes two primary claims. First, the concern of the
legal system should be the fit between bias and the base rate, i.e.
whether the accuracy of the base rate matches well with observer bias.
Equation 1 and Figure 1 demonstrate that total accuracy increases as the
base rate increases (is upward-sloping) if and only if there is a veracity
effect-truth judgments are more accurate than lie judgments. This
leads directly to the notion of "fit" described in the main text. Overall
accuracy rates are relatively high if observers are truth-biased when they
are confronted with mostly truths and lie-biased if they are confronted
with mostly lies.
Second, the main text claims that background beliefs about
truthfulness matter more than the information received by observers.
Park/Levine's result that accuracy is a linear function of the base
rate P(T) also implies that the relevant conditional probabilities, e.g.
P(-H I-7), are independent of the base rate. This leads easily to the
conclusion that P(H I T) oc P(H). That is, the truth bias, P(H), is
highly correlated with P(H T), the conditional probability that a
statement will be judged as honest given that it is in fact true. The prior
expectation of honesty is more important than the data received.

